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Title: Any room at the inn? The impact of religious elite discourse on immigration 
attitudes in the UK 
Short Title: Any room at the inn?   
Research Highlights  
This article: 
 Explores the neglected role of elite cues as a factor in driving immigration 
attitudes, demonstrating that impacts can be found for those most exposed to 
elite messaging – in this case frequent church attenders of those belonging to the 
Anglican faith in the UK. 
 Concentrates on an under-explored set of societal actors, religious elites, who 
have the potential to be powerful actors in terms of shaping public opinion and 
therefore de/constructing issues of security.  
 Demonstrates the effective use of mixed methods, synthesising discourse 
analysis with statistical analyses to connect elite cues regarding a critical issue, 
migration, with public attitudes. This has important theoretical and 
methodological consequences for the broad immigration attitudes literature, the 
scientific study of religion and Securitisation theory.  
 Finds that, the Church of England challenges negative presentations of migration 
as a threat. Despite Anglicans on average tending to hold more negative 
immigration attitudes than those of no faith, for those Anglicans most exposed to 
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Church messaging through attendance at religious services, immigration 
attitudes become more positive in comparison to affiliates with limited exposure.  
Abstract  
To date, scholarship has neglected the role of elite cues in shaping immigration 
attitudes. When included, attention has been limited to political elites and parties. Yet, 
other societal actors have the potential to shape attitudes. This paper employs mixed-
methods to analyse the discourse of the Church of England and attempts to uncover 
whether this discourse impacts on the immigration attitudes of ‘their’ audience, in the 
UK during 2005-2015. The discourse analysis finds that non-threatening migration 
frames dominate. Using ESS data (Rounds 4-7), regression analysis indicates that 
greater exposure to elite cues, via attendance at religious services, is consistently related 
to more positive immigration attitudes. Thus, for those most exposed, elite cues may be 
acting as a partial bulwark against the ubiquitous security-threat discourse of political 
elites. Overall, findings imply that despite their previous neglect, religious elite actors 
have the capacity to shape immigration attitudes and therefore de/construct issues of 
security. 
Keywords: Immigration, Religion, Securitisation, Elites 
Number of Tables: 1 
Number of Figures: 1 (attached separately) 
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Word Count: 7983 
Introduction 
Across Europe, migration has become entrenched as a security issue (Bigo, 2006; 
Huysmans, 2000). In the UK, migration has been at the apex of the political agenda and 
was at the epicentre of the Brexit debate. Continent-wide, right-wing anti-immigration 
parties are making political gains, whilst in the UK, pre-Brexit, UKIP had been 
enjoying unprecedented electoral and polling success. Amidst what has become a 
divisive and at times toxic debate on immigration, the importance of developing a 
nuanced understanding of how immigration attitudes are constructed is more pressing 
than ever. This paper contributes to this enterprise by exploring the neglected role of 
elite cues in the process of immigration attitude formation, particularly those cues of 
non-traditional security actors, focusing on religious elites from the Anglican faith in 
the UK.  
To date, many individual-level and contextual factors have been explored as 
potential drivers of immigration attitudes (for example, Semyonov et al., 2004; 
Sniderman et al., 2004). However, the potential for elite cues to shape public attitudes 
has been neglected. Elite cues have at times been explored as a factor in attitude 
formation in general, for example toward EU integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; 
McLaren, 2001). But as a propeller of immigration attitudes, attention towards the 
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effects of elite cues has been minimal (Hellwig and Kweon, 2016). In the handful of 
studies that have included elite messaging in the analysis, cues have been shown to play 
a significant role in shaping immigration attitudes in specific contexts (Martin and 
Jones, 2017). Yet, analysis has been limited to political elites and partiesi. This is 
despite other societal actors having the potential to wield considerable influence in the 
process of shaping public attitudes (Karyotis and Patrikios, 2010). Religious elites are 
one such group. 
Migration has now been established in the ‘moral’ realm (alongside abortion and 
same-sex marriage) where religious elites and organisations are taking public positions 
(Knoll, 2009). Elite rhetoric has arisen as a key factor in the relationship between moral 
concerns and public attitudes (Clifford et al., 2015). For the most devout religious elite 
utterances can be understood as direct interpretations of God's wisdom and desires 
(Lausten and Wæver, 2000). Generally focusing on the US, scholarship has tried to 
explore the link between religious elite discourse and the attitudes of their flocks across 
a wide range of social and political issues (Djupe and Calfano, 2013a; Djupe and 
Glibert, 2009), including migration (Nteta and Wallsten, 2012; Wallsten and Nteta, 
2016). Evidence has shown that religious elites can indeed be influential, yet overall it 
is posited ‘we know relatively little about the impact of religiosity on the role of 
religious group cues in shaping attitudes towards immigration’ (Ben-Nun Bloom et al., 
2015: 218). 
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With migration often presented through the lens of security (Bigo, 2002; Doty, 
2007; Huysmans, 1995), the theoretical framework adopted draws upon and extends the 
Copenhagen School’s (CS) Securitisation theory. Securitisation theory has been one of 
the most innovative and prominent attempts to understand how security issues emerge 
and dissolve (Bright, 2015). Rather than referring to something objectively ‘real’, 
security is argued to be socially constructed through discourse (Buzan et al., 1998). For 
the issue of migration, qualitative studies (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002; Basham and 
Vaughan-Williams, 2013) have demonstrated that, across Europe, discourse has 
presented migration and migrants as threatening the core of societal wellbeing.  
This article adopts a mixed methods approach. Due to the context of Brexit and 
the prevailing threat-based messaging that has characterised political elite debate on 
migration, the UK (2005-2015) has been selected as a critical case (Yin, 2014)ii. As the 
largest faith in the UK – and with approximately 820,000 weekly attendees – the 
Anglican faith is deemed the most prudent to analyseiii. This is a substantial minority 
cohort that has the potential to be affected by elite messaging. Discourse analysis is 
used to determine the prevailing migration frames from the Church of England (CoE) 
and CoE elites. Crucially, the CoE’s central migration messages are swimming against 
an increasingly hostile discursive and attitudinal tide. Paradoxically, cutting against the 
dominant discourse presents the CoE with both a challenging set of circumstances and a 
valuable opportunity to exhibit a clear signal. Public opinion data is then employed to 
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investigate the likelihood that, controlling for all other potentially relevant factors, 
discourse coming from religious elites has had an impact on ‘their’ audience.  
 The article proceeds in a series of steps. First, the theoretical framework will be 
outlined, drawing upon Securitisation theory as well as the broad immigration attitudes 
literature and scholarship that concentrates on religiosity and prejudice towards out-
groups/immigrants and the role of religious elites. Second, the qualitative portion of the 
mixed-methods research design will be laid out, accompanied by a concise analysis of 
the prevailing migration discourse from the CoE. The discourse analysis finds that the 
dominant frames from the Church and Anglican elites present migration in non-
threatening terms (desecuritising frames). Love thy neighbour is preached. Third, the 
quantitative part of the research design will be outlined and the potential impacts of said 
discourse will be explored using statistical analyses. The results suggest that greater 
exposure to the desecuritising cues from Anglican elites (using church attendance as a 
proxy) seems to impact in the expected direction. Love thy neighbour appears to be 
internalised. Last, the implications of the empirical findings will be discussed. Overall, 
the findings indicate that elite cues of non-traditional security actors can be influential 
in shaping public attitudes and therefore in the de/construction of security issues and 
that the adoption of mixed methods can be a fruitful addition to the arsenal of both 
securitisation and broad immigration/religiosity attitudes research. 
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Theoretical Framework 
In recent decades, debates over the definition of security between ‘traditional’ 
and ‘new security thinking’ approaches have been at the core of the sub-discipline of 
Security Studies (see Walt, 1991). Rooted in realism, the traditional state-military 
conceptualisation of security has been argued to be both too narrow and too shallow 
(Buzan, 1983). Securitisation theory, devised by the CS, has been one of the most 
influential alternatives in redefining security. The CS adopts a social constructionist 
approach: security does not exist objectively ‘out there’ but is brought into being 
through discursive action (Buzan et al., 1998). Security is thus a ‘speech act’. Yet, the 
use of the word ‘security’ itself is not required: ‘[w]hat is essential is the designation of 
an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance 
of that designation by a significant audience’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 27)iv.  
With security constructed through discourse, the task of the analyst is to trace 
the discursive interventions of elite actors that attempt to frame an issue as one of 
security (a securitising move) or otherwise (a desecuritising move) (Buzan et al., 1998). 
Yet, despite the CS’s theoretical innovation, Securitisation theory suffers from several 
theoretical weaknesses – two of which are addressed in this study.  
The first weakness rests upon an empirical overemphasis on traditional security 
actors, namely political and security elites (Karyotis and Patrikios, 2010). Theoretically 
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there are not any specific criteria one must meet in order to become a securitising actor. 
For Wæver (1995: 57) however, ‘[s]ecurity is articulated only from a specific place, in 
an institutional voice, by elites.’ The CS’s tendency to concentrate on political elites has 
been criticised and shown to have theoretical/empirical shortcomings (Doty 2007) and 
normative limitations (Hansen, 2000; McDonald, 2008). For example, Karyotis and 
Patrikios’ (2010) unique study of the securitisation of migration in Greece demonstrated 
that religious elites were able to entrench the issue as one of security, despite contrary 
attempts from political actorsv.  
However, in the UK (and beyond) what form of influence religious elites may 
illicit, is uncertain.  It is a perennial question as to whether religion is a force of 
intolerance and exclusion (Brewer et al., 2010), a source of peace and unity (Little, 
2007) or has a Janus-face (Appleby, 1999). Yet, studies that have sought to explore the 
role of religion and religiosity in shaping attitudes have produced mixed results. 
Reviewing the literature on religion and prejudice towards out-groups between 1940 
and 1990, Batson et al. (1993) show that in 37/47 cases there is a positive relationship 
between religiosity and prejudice, whilst the inverse relationship arose twice. A more 
recent review from 1990-2003 also found the vast majority of relationships to be in line 
with this trend (Hunsberger and Jackson, 2005). For immigration attitudes in particular, 
findings are also somewhat mixed, being both positively (Eisinga et al., 1990; McDaniel 
et al., 2011; Scheepers et al., 2002) and negatively (Boomgaarden and Freire, 2009; 
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Lubbers et al., 2006) related to intolerance. Thus whilst the majority of literature shows 
religiosity to be associated with prejudice toward out-groups, including immigrants, the 
results are not uniform. 
 However, religion and religiosity are not unitary concepts. A common approach 
is to conceptualise religion as a multifaceted phenomenon comprised of three 
components - Behaviour, Belief and Belonging, the Three B’s (Smidt, et al., 2009; 
Wald and Smidt, 1993) - with each having differing effects on public attitudes (Ben-
Nun Bloom and Arikan, 2012a, 2012b). Yet, this article is not designed to explore 
which facets of religiosity are driving immigration attitudes and is instead focused upon 
the previously under-researched role of elite cues - the prior neglect of which may be 
one key factor underpinning the inconsistency regarding the effects of religion and 
religiosity on attitudes towards immigrants and out-groups. Indeed, Djupe and Calfano 
(2012: 4) state that: 
 We have probably learned as much as we can from the typical measures of 
religiosity, broad religious attachments and religious beliefs. Instead, this 
literature needs to bear witness to how religious contexts shape the sociology and 
psychology of how people interact with and think about out-groups… This 
dictates a focus on information provision from, especially, religious elites who 
report conveying just the values we inquire about with some frequency. 
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Djupe and Calfano (2012: 2) show that ‘exposure to inclusive religious values 
encourages people to reduce the sense of threat they feel toward the group they most 
dislike, which fuels tolerance of their political presence.’ In light of how easily a sense 
of threat/dislike can be easily manipulated (Tajfel, 1970), Djupe and Calfano (2012: 4) 
‘suspect that clergy are especially important cue givers who can prime inclusion or 
exclusion and thus weaken or reinforce in-group identities’.  
The religion and politics literature has begun to try and unpack the role of 
religious elite cues across a plethora of social and political issues beyond ‘traditional 
issues’, including the environment (Djupe and Gwiasda, 2010), US foreign policy 
(Djupe and Calfano, 2013b) and race (Brown et al., 2014). A series of studies have 
highlighted that religious elite influence is a diffuse phenomenon and the power clergy 
can wield is constrained by a panoply of contextual factors (Djupe and Calfano, 2013a; 
Djupe and Gilbert, 2009; Guth et al., 1997). However, results are far from uniform with 
several studies finding positive effects for elite cues (Brown et al., 2017; Fetzer, 2001; 
Wald, 1992; Wald et al., 1988), including on the issue of migration (Margolis, 
forthcoming; Wallsten and Nteta, 2016). Yet, to reiterate, it is argued that to this point 
‘we know relatively little’ (Ben-Nun Bloom et al., 2015, 218) about the role of religious 
elite cues in shaping immigration attitudes – a gap which is surprising in light of the key 
role elite rhetoric has been shown to play in the relationship between moral concerns 
and policy attitudes (Clifford and Jerit, 2013). Thus, religious actors and institutions 
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may be influential as part of the de/securitising process in shaping public attitudes – a 
proposition that will be explored in the UK for the issue of migration. 
 The second weakness of Securitisation theory addressed in this article relates to 
the CS’s prescription of discourse analysis as the ‘obvious method’ to study security 
(Buzan et al., 1998: 176), marginalising the audience. To reiterate, the de/construction 
of security for the CS is ‘an essentially intersubjective process’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 30) 
between the de/securitising actor and the audience receiving the message. An ‘issue is 
securitised only if and when the audience accept it as such’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 25). 
However, discourse analysis is not overly well equipped to investigate questions of 
audience acceptance/rejection.  
Hansen (2011: 360) suggests that the audience, as enmeshed in discourse, may 
have their opinion ‘detected through surveys, polls or elections’ (see also Wilkinson, 
2011) – a technique utilised by Karyotis and Patrikios (2010) vi. This article seeks to 
build on the above calls and empirical findings. As such, survey evidence is introduced 
in the attempt re-focus attention on the audience in the securitisation process by tracking 
whether elite de/securitising frames appear to impact public opinion. 
Yet, which ‘public’ the analyst should concentrate on is unclear. The concept of 
the audience in securitisation theory has been ‘radically underdeveloped’ (Williams, 
2011: 213). Several scholars have proposed disaggregating the audience (for example, 
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Balzacq, 2005; Léonard and Kaunert, 2011; Roe, 2008) as it is suggested that the 
audience differs depending on the issue, actor, actor intention and context (Balzacq et 
al., 2016; Klüfers, 2014). Hence, in this article, it is recognised that Anglican elites, 
whilst conscious of engaging a wider audience are first, predominantly addressing ‘their 
flock’, and second, likely to have the most influence on the attitudes of said flock. 
It is important to note also that a small cohort of studies looking at public 
attitudes more broadly has, similar to the religion and politics literature mentioned 
above, endeavoured to incorporate the influence of elite cues. For example, there are 
several studies regarding European integration (Steenbergen et al., 2007; Vossing, 
2015) and a handful concerning immigration attitudes (Hellwig and Kweon, 2016 – also 
see Weldon, 2006 for ‘institutional cues’). Thus there is a recognition that public 
attitudes can be shaped from ‘top down’ processes. Yet, both sets of studies are limited 
to traditional security actors. By widening the analytical net to focus upon religious 
elites, this article seeks to unpack the attitudinal effects of elite cues, and subsequently 
the construction of immigration attitudes and security issues, more precisely. 
In sum, the effects of religion/religiosity on immigration attitudes have produced 
mixed results, despite the dominant link between religion and increased prejudice. Yet, 
the effects of elite discourse as a specific explanatory variable have been given 
insufficient attention. In the few exceptions in the broad immigration attitudes literature 
the lens has been restricted to political elites and parties. In the literature that 
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concentrates on the effects of religiosity on attitudes specifically, there is a nascent 
recognition that the dominant paradigm (the Three B’s) has been largely exhausted, 
with a need to re-focus attention towards elite messaging (how religious elites frame 
certain ‘Beliefs’) to unpack the previously contrasting results. Current scholarship on 
the effects of religious elite cues has been mixed, with the capacity for religious elites to 
impact the attitudes of their flocks across a range of social and political issues being 
inconsistent. Exploration of CoE cues and attitudes in the UK engages this scholarship 
directly. Finally, the article also seeks to contribute to Securitisation research 
theoretically and methodologically by broadening the analytical lens to focus on a 
previously marginalised, but potentially significant set of non-traditional security actors 
and introducing quantitative methods to connect elite messages with the receiving 
audience. 
 
Love Thy Neighbour? Church of England Migration Discourse 
This section outlines the approach taken to analysing elite discourse for the 
purposes of this paper before discussing the results of that analysis. The following 
section of the paper then investigates the likelihood that messages from elites had any 
effect.  
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Underpinning the security-migration nexus is the CS’s concept of ‘societal 
security’ (Wæver, 1993) - where societal identity is presented as being existentially 
threatened. In short, a  
successful securitisation of an identity involves precisely the capacity to decide on 
the limits of a given identity, to oppose it to what it is not, to cast this as a 
relationship of threat or even enmity, and to have this decision and declaration 
accepted by the relevant group (Williams, 2003: 519-20).  
Thus ‘societal security’ suppresses identities into a simplified and unitary 
formvii. Hence the discourse analysis in this study sought to trace whether the CoE 
framed migrants/migration as a threat (a securitising discourse) or not a threat (a 
desecuritising discourse) to ‘us’ as Britain/Britishviii. Borrowing from Gamson and 
Modigliani (1989), was ‘the essence of the [migration] issue’ presented as threatening 
or not? It is posited that the ‘threat’ posed by migration is articulated around four axes: 
Identitarian, Securitarian; Economic, and Political (see Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002; 
Karyotis, 2007). Each axis percolates around a different referent object: 
societal/national identity (Identitarian); border security/sovereignty/crime 
(Securitarian); economic security, covering employment, wages and welfare 
(Economic); and political stability (Political). The four axes model provided an 
analytical framework to structure the discourse analysis. 
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The analysis spans a 10 year period between 2005-2015.ix In the wake of Brexit, 
the centrality of migration to political debate and the rise of right-wing anti-immigration 
populism, the UK has been selected as a critical case (Yin, 2014). The decision to focus 
upon the discourse of the CoE is based on it being the largest faith and its position as 
the established church, providing a formal role in Parliament as well as ensuring the 
Church and elite church actors are endowed with prominent public roles and platforms. 
Although designed to be an illuminating case regarding the potential for non-traditional 
elite cues to effect public attitudes and therefore the de/construction of security issues, 
on an empirical basis, the approximate 880,000 weekly cohort of church attendees is not 
insubstantial. The collection of sources followed Buzan et al.’s (1998: 177) instructions 
to focus on ‘major instances’. Subsequently, elite interventions (speeches, writings) that 
fail to reach (deliberately or otherwise) a large audience are not considered. Sources 
were identified through extensive internet searches of Church website archives in 
addition to the use of internet search engines. If certain interventions were not found, 
this is not deemed problematic as ‘obscure texts’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 177) are to be 
avoided. The repository of sources identified included eight key documents produced by 
the CoEx that engage with migration - to gain a clear insight into the ‘official line’ - and 
20 public interventions (media pieces and public homilies/statements) into the migration 
debate from high ranking CoE officials (Archbishops, former Archbishops and Senior 
Bishops).  
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In brief, despite two actors (Michael Nazir-Ali, Bishop of Rochester, and 
George Carey, former Archbishop of Canterbury – the latter being far more prominent), 
promoting securitising threat frames, desecuritising actors are far more numerous and, 
crucially, the ‘official’ CoE line is explicitly one that attempts to promulgate non-threat-
based messages. Limited space dictates that a full account of the analysis cannot be 
provided. Thus, there will be a brief summary of the official documents and elite 
messages, accompanied by illustrative examples.   
Beginning with the eight documents categorised as official Church literature, 
three key points emerge. First, there are relatively consistent themes which persist 
throughout, centring on: the fundamental notion of a universal humanity rooted in 
Christian teaching (‘we are all God’s children’); clear attempts to deconstruct unitary, 
homogenous notions of identity, whilst placing emphasis on the positive impacts 
garnered through diversity and presenting diversity as a good in and of itself; the 
Christian duty to care for the vulnerable and show compassion (‘the Good Samaritan’); 
and explicit criticism of parties which pursue divisive, racist, and/or anti-immigration 
politics. The second important point concerns the consistency of the framing of 
migration, with the ‘official line’ of the Anglican Church remaining stable. The third 
point of note is the official line itself: overall, there is clear and consistent framing of 
migration in non-threatening, desecuritising terms. 
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An indicative example of these desecuritising cues comes from the CoE’s 2015 
election letter. When discussing identity and migration, the document draws upon the 
parable of the Good Samaritan asking, ‘who counts as “we”?’ (The Church of England 
2015, 43). It goes on,  
The politics of migration has, too often, been framed in crude terms of us’ and 
‘them’ with scant regard for the Christian traditions of neighbourliness and 
hospitality. The way we talk about migration, with ethnically identifiable 
communities being treated as ‘the problem’ has, deliberately or inadvertently, 
created an ugly undercurrent of racism in every debate about immigration. Crude 
stereotyping is incompatible with a Christian understanding of human social 
relationships (44). 
To reiterate, securitising migration relies on Wæver’s (1993) concept of societal 
security, where the identities of the host population and migrants are simplified into 
unitary blocs and portrayed as being incompatible and existing in conflict. In the above 
extract, and throughout the election letter, there is a deliberate attempt to challenge 
ideas of a homogenous ‘us’ and ‘them’ by pointing to their inaccuracy (‘crude 
stereotyping’). Note also the invocation of religious symbolism (the ‘Good Samaritan’). 
This is significant as invoking the ‘Word of God’ is a powerful rhetorical device 
available to religious actors in a way that it is not for traditional security actors (Lausten 
and Wæver, 2000). 
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Turning to the public interventions from elite Church actors, the themes broadly 
mirrored those from the official CoE documents. Moreover, in line with the dominant 
Church frames, desecuritising actors and messages were preeminent. However, unlike 
the official documents, the field was marginally contested as securitising threat frames 
did appear, particularly from the former Archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey.  
Beginning with the predominant, desecuritising frames from Anglican elites, 
Rowan Williams (2010) notes:  
[O]ne of the mainsprings of Christian self-understanding in the formative years of 
the Church's life was the idea that the believer was essentially a ‘migrant’… the 
believer would be involved in discovering what in that society could be endorsed 
and celebrated and what should be challenged. The Christian, you could say, was 
present precisely as someone who was under an obligation to extend or enrich the 
argument…It does no harm for us to be ‘made strange’ to ourselves…Arguments 
are enriched when people join in that don’t usually share a group’s story but learn 
the language well enough to bring to it something fresh. 
Williams is framing the evolution of society, via the influence of the believer (migrant), 
as a positive. Initially, the identity of the society is portrayed in non-fixed manner, open 
to and constructed by, change. The believer, due to his/her unfamiliarity and difference, 
naturally challenges norms or practices. Yet, this is posited as being necessary for a 
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society to mature, improve and become ‘better’. It is not framed as a threat where ‘our 
ways’, understood in essentialist terms and as implicitly good, are being undermined or 
contaminated by ‘their’ less good or bad ways. ‘Society’ is thus portrayed in an 
inclusive sense, where the ‘us’, rather than being in a conflictual relationship with the 
‘them’, takes on a universal form. Overall, at the crux of the message, the believer, or 
more precisely the migrant, is presented as a key ingredient to societal health – a clear 
desecuritising frame.  
Turning to the minority securitising messages from Carey, it is important to note 
that George Carey held the position of Archbishop from 1991 until 2002, prior to the 
period of analysis - the messages of the two serving Archbishops during the period of 
analysis, Rowan Williams (2002-2011) and Justin Welby (2011-Present), are centred on 
desecuritising frames. Thus, whilst as a former Archbishop Carey is endowed with a 
degree of influence, he no longer possesses the power to speak ‘for the Church’. But 
perhaps most significantly, when serving as Archbishop, Carey’s messaging on 
migration different greatly from his later interventions, taking on the form of classic 
desecuritising, pro-migration frames (see for example Carey’s 1998 New Year address 
regarding refugees – BBC, 1999). Indeed, the right-wing Daily Mail (2007) – a 
newspaper which tends to favour a more restrictionist migration policy – bemoaned the 
fact Carey ‘toed the pro-migration party line’ whilst in office and only began to speak in 
a more securitising manner years after. This finding that Carey preached a different 
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message when in and out of office may help to support the assumption in this article 
that pro-migration (desecuritising) elite cues are likely reflected in the average 
messaging of Anglican clergy: even when elite clergy have strong feelings on the 
migration issue that are perhaps out of step with the majority of their fellows/the 
‘official line’ they appear to be constrained by ‘group norms’ in the CoE to stay on 
message. 
In sum, the discourse analysis has found that, whilst there were a limited number 
of security threat frames from CoE elites, these were very much in the minority and 
crucially, the official CoE line universally framed migration in non-threatening terms. 
As such, the following hypothesis is derived: For Anglicans, greater exposure to 
religious elite cues (via church attendance) will be associated with more positive 
immigration attitudes. 
 
Message Received? The Impact of Elite Messaging on Attitudes to Immigration 
To explore this hypothesis quantitative methods are introduced. The data utilised 
are based on the European Social Survey (ESS), rounds 3-7 (2006-2014). First, bivariate 
correlations are investigated to test the relationship between the dependent variable, 
immigration attitudes, and religiosity. The bivariate analysis is cross-national, designed 
to illuminate any general trends between immigration attitudes and religiosity in Europe 
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and the UK. Further bivariate relationships are investigated for UK Anglicans 
specifically.  
Following McLaren (2012), three questions designed to tap into both the 
economic and cultural facets of immigration, and that appear consistently in each round 
of the survey, have been combined into a single Immigration Attitudes Index xi. The 
inter-item correlations (Pearson’s r) ranged from 0.68 to 0.78, Cronbach’s alpha was 
0.89 and all three items load onto a single factor. The three questions, operating on an 
11-point scale where 0 represents a negative view and 10 a positive, are as follows: 
‘Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to 
live here from other countries?’; ‘Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is 
generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?’; 
‘Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from 
other countries?’ 
Accounting for the need to disaggregate religiosity due to its multifaceted 
nature, three different measures have been investigated. These relate to frequency of 
attendance at religious services (Attendance), frequency of prayer outside of religious 
services (Prayer) and how religious a person feels (Religious Feeling). Attendance and 
Prayer are measured on a 7-point scale, wherexii: 1=Never, 2=Less often 3=Only on 
special holy days, 4=At least once a month, 5=Once a week, 6=More than once a week, 
and 7=Every day. Religious Feeling is measured on an 11-point scale with 0 
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representing not at all religious and 10 very religious. In line with previous research 
(Karyotis and Patrikios, 2010; Knoll, 2009) church attendance is utilised as a proxy for 
exposure to elite messaging. In addition, the hierarchical nature of the Church informs 
the assumption that the predominant Church position would be communicated by the 
majority of Church actors and therefore that these elite messages will be reflective of 
the frames that the average church goer will be exposed to. The potential limitations of 
this research design will be addressed in the conclusion. 
Second, multivariate analysis using linear regression is investigatedxiii.  In 
keeping with the broad immigration attitudes literature (McLaren, 2001; Quillian, 
1995), relevant demographic controls (Gender, Age, Unemployment and Education) and 
further individual-level controls (Political Ideology [Left-Right Self-Placement and 
Party Identification], Life Satisfaction, Social Trust, Personal Economic Satisfaction, 
Country-Level Economic Satisfaction, and Contactxiv) are included. The regression was 
comprised of three models. Model 1 contains the three measures of religiosity: 
Attendance; Prayer; and Religious Feeling. With Attendance acting as a proxy for 
exposure to elite religious cues, the other two measures are included to act as a form of 
control, to determine whether, rather than exposure to elite cues, it is in fact religiosity 
in general that is having an effect on immigration attitudes. Model 2 and Model 3 bring 
in the demographic (including party ID) and non-demographic controls, respectively.  
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 To begin, bivariate correlations were investigated between the Immigration 
Attitudes Index and the three measures of religiosity for 31 European countries (Figure 
1). Based on the previous findings mentioned above, one would expect an inconsistent 
picture with the majority of relationships being negative, where higher levels of 
religiosity correlate with more negative attitudes towards immigrants. Results are in line 
with this expectation indicating that there is nothing ‘special’ about religion/religiosity 
in and of itself and that domestic context is paramount. Notably the UK does not fit the 
majority position – religiosity correlates with more positive immigration attitudes. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Based upon the CoE’s migration discourse, it would be expected that when UK 
Anglicans are analysed independently, a positive relationship would emerge. This is 
borne out: Attendance (Pearson’s r=0.239**) has the most powerful relationship 
compared to the other two measures of religiosity (Prayer, r=0.098**; Religious 
Feeling, r=0.150**). Importantly, the correlation itself is greater than that for the sum of 
all UK religions shown in Figure 1 (r=0.144**), indicating an especially strong effect 
for Attendance for Anglicans. At surface level, this seems to suggest that religiosity in 
the UK, and Anglicanism in particular may be serving to help desecuritise the issue of 
migration, in stark contrast to many other European countries, where religion or 
religiosity may, in fact, be contributing to the securitisation of migration. This provides 
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initial support for the hypothesis that elite discourse, captured via Attendance, is having 
a positive effect on immigration attitudes.  
Yet, the bivariate correlations do not reveal whether the relationships will hold 
once other potentially powerful explanatory variables are considered.  These are 
introduced in the multivariate analyses shown in Table 1. Beginning with Model 1, 
there is a statistically significant positive relationship between Attendance and 
immigration attitudes (p≤0.001). Attendance maintains the same level of significance in 
Model 2 when Party ID and the demographic controls are introduced, and in Model 3, 
when all variables have been enteredxv. These results buttress those from the bivariate 
analysis, providing further support for the hypothesis that exposure to the desecuritising, 
non-threat-based cues from Anglican elites, measured via church attendance, is having 
an effect on the immigration attitudes of Anglicansxvi.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Importantly, despite all three measures of religiosity for Anglicans having 
positive bivariate correlations with attitudes to immigration, Attendance is the only 
measure to be consistently associated with more positive immigration attitudes. Prayer 
did not garner any statistically significant relationships, whilst effects were only found 
for Religious Feeling in Model 2, before disappearing in Model 3. In line with the 
heterogeneous picture identified in the cross-national bivariate analysis, this indicates 
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that it is not religion or religiosity independently that is having an effect on attitudes, or 
it would be expected that each measure of religiosity would produce similar effects. 
Thus whilst imbued with limitations, the elite cues argument (that the important element 
lies beyond religiosity, potentially in the cuing of certain religious beliefs/attitudes) can 
be viewed as more powerful if policy positions of religious elites/organisations are clear 
(see Knoll, 2009) – which they are for the CoE. 
It is crucial to note that Anglicans, on average, hold more negative attitudes than 
atheists (results not shown). This would seem to support the theoretical assumption of 
security as a ‘top-down’ process. A ‘bottom-up’ process would entail elite cues being 
driven by audience attitudes: meaning Anglican elite cues should be predominantly anti-
migration to match the negative immigration attitudes of the average affiliate. Yet, 
migration discourse of Anglican elites is overwhelmingly positive. For UK politics, it is 
therefore suggested that it is not religiosity that may be serving to help desecuritise the 
issue of immigration, as indicated by the bivariate results – especially as affiliation to 
the Anglican faith is associated with more negative immigration attitudes than those of 
no faith. And indeed, recent analysis of the link between religious affiliation and voting 
in the 2016 Referendum revealed approximately 60% of Anglicans voted to Leave, the 
highest Leave vote of any faith (with a majority of Catholic, Islam and Church of 
Scotland affiliates voting to Remain) (British Religion in Numbers, 2017). Rather, those 
Anglicans of high religiosity (in terms of Attendance) are being exposed more 
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consistently to desecuritising elite messaging compared to their low or non-attending 
Anglican counterparts. This discourse may have been acting as a shield against both the 
potential intolerance inducing effects of religious affiliation (the ‘Belonging’, tribal 
dimension of religiosity) and the security threat-based frames that have dominated 
political elite discourse in the UK. In light of the centrality of migration to the Brexit 
debate and the sharp correlation between Anglicanism and voting Leave, perhaps CoE 
discourse contributed to prevent a more convincing vote to withdraw.  
Conclusion 
This article has explored the migration discourse of elites from the Anglican 
faith in the UK from 2005-2015 and has attempted to gauge whether these elite cues 
have ‘cut through’ and subsequently influenced the attitudes of ‘their’ audience (church 
attendees). The discourse analysis revealed that the dominant frames from both the CoE 
and elite CoE actors presented migration in non-threatening terms – a desecuritising 
discourse. Using this information, it was hypothesised that increased exposure to the 
desecuritising elite messaging would be associated with more positive immigration 
attitudes. The results from the analysis support this hypothesis. This strengthens the 
argument that it is not religion or religiosity in and of itself that is having an effect on 
attitudes. Instead, the elite messaging to which those of high religiosity (in terms of 
church attendance) are exposed may be acting as a bulwark against both the potential 
intolerance inducing effects of religious affiliation (‘Belonging’) and the ubiquitous 
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security threat-based frames that have constituted much of political elite discourse in the 
UK. 
 Yet it is important to acknowledge the limitation, not unique to this study, of 
using church attendance as proxy for exposure to elite cues. The dominance of 
desecuritising messages from both the CoE and CoE elites and the absence of 
securitising frames from Carey whilst serving as Archbishop informs the assumption 
that the majority of church goers will be exposed to the pro-migration ‘party-line’ at 
their individual houses of worship. However, this remains an assumption. Moreover, 
even if this assumption holds, the further assumption that church goers are indeed 
directly impacted by elite cues is still unclear. This second assumption is problematised 
by previous findings that have demonstrated both the influence and lack of influence of 
religious elite cues (Djupe and Gilbert, 2009). Further research penetrating deeper into 
the CoE to establish the presence, frequency, framing, and audience digestion of 
migration cues is necessary. Effects may result directly from elite cues or rest more 
upon the priming of certain inclusive or exclusive values within the Church (see Djupe 
and Calfano, 2009). Experimental techniques (see Djupe and Calfano, 2013a) to 
establish greater confidence in the causal connection between cues and attitudes offers a 
promising path to build on the findings in this study. 
In spite of the above limitation, several implications arise from the research 
design and consequent empirical findings. First, unlike much of the Securitisation and 
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immigration attitudes research that has previously focused upon the effects of cues from 
political elites and political parties, this article has demonstrated that, for specific 
societal constituencies, non-traditional security actors may be playing a pivotal role in 
shaping immigration attitudes. For scholars attempting to grapple with migration 
politics – especially in light of the sharp rise in anti-immigration rhetoric, policy and 
attitudes following both Brexit and the so-called ‘migration crisis’ in Europe – the 
actions of religious elites and institutions may be in need of greater attention. This is 
perhaps especially true in states where religious and national identities are deeply 
entwined and religiosity is high (meaning large audiences may be exposed to elite cues) 
– as is the case in southern and eastern Europe which has been most exposed to the 
‘migration crisis’. For those with a normative agenda who seek to challenge the 
securitisation of migration, the capacity for non-traditional security actors to influence 
public attitudes and therefore contribute to the de/construction of security issues, 
presents both a cause for optimism and caution.  
Second, the findings have consequences for the study of religion and politics as 
well as the broad immigration attitudes literature. Regarding the former, the findings 
support calls to account for elite discourse to better elucidate the contradictory findings 
arising from research that utilises the Three B’s model – with prior neglect perhaps 
contributing to a considerable degree of the inconsistency in the effects that religiosity 
has been found to have on attitudes. For the latter, incorporating elite discourse in 
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statistical models may be essential to gain a more complete understanding of what is 
driving immigration attitudes.  
Third, for Securitisation theory, alongside highlighting the value in expanding 
the analytical net beyond traditional security actors, the article has underlined the 
effectiveness of disaggregating the audience and engaging with context to identify 
which audience(s) the actor is primarily trying to engage and is most likely to reach. 
This opens up the possibility that other elite societal actors that represent organisations 
that are integral to identity (like a religious faith), may also have the potential to 
influence attitudes and the de/construction of key political and security issues. Last, a 
central argument this paper makes is that synthesising quantitative methods with 
discourse analysis can be a valuable addition to securitisation research as a means of 
identifying whether or not the de/securitising messages of elites have been 
accepted/rejected. Thus studies have the capacity to move beyond an analysis of 
de/securitising attempts (discursive interventions) and can develop a more 
comprehensive understanding of the securitisation process in its entirety - a task in light 
of current migration politics, and the political climate more widely, that is arguably 
more pressing than ever.   
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Table 1: Investigating the Effects of Church of England Discourse on the Immigration Attitudes of UK Anglicans 
(ESS Rounds 4-7). 
 
 
Variable 
  
Model 1 
   
Model 2 
   
Model 3 
  
 b SE Sig. b SE Sig. b SE Sig. 
Measures of Religiosity        
Church Attendance (Elite Cues) 0.337   0.04 *** 0.206 0.039 *** 0.192 0.037 *** 
Frequency of Prayer -0.036 0.026 - 0.006 0.025 - 0.037 0.024 - 
Religious Feeling 0.048 0.028 - 0.074 0.027 ** 0.035 0.026 - 
          
Party ID          
Labour    0.191 0.135 - 0.364 0.145 ** 
Liberal Democrat   0.894 0.197 *** 0.948 0.192 *** 
UKIP    -1.891 0.255 *** -1.566 0.244 *** 
Green    0.315 0.537 - 0.395 0.513 - 
SNP    -2.698 1.988 - -2.333 1.888 - 
Plaid Cymru   -0.153 0.815 - -0.486 0.776 - 
Other Party   0.311 0.635 - 0.393 0.603 - 
No Party    -0.192 0.114 - 0.008 0.115 - 
          
Demographics         
Gender    -0.336 0.098 *** -0.337 0.094 *** 
Age    -0.009 0.003 ** -0.015 0.003 *** 
Unemployed   0.216 0.287 -  0.325 0.275 - 
Education   0.259 0.032 ***    0.2    0.03 *** 
         
Other Controls         
Social Trust      0.234 0.029 *** 
Life Satisfaction      0.029 0.025 - 
Country-Level Economic Satisfaction    0.175 0.022 *** 
Household Income Satisfaction    -0.16 0.066 ** 
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Left-Right Ideology      -0.005 0.028 - 
 
Adj R2 0.054   0.150   0.237   
Constant 3.35 0.13 *** 3.363 0.274 *** 1.987 0.401 *** 
N 1857         
 
         
Dependent Variable=Immigration Attitudes Index. Excluded Dummies: Party ID=Conservative; Gender=Male. b=unstandardised 
coefficients. SE=Standard Error. Significance Levels: *≤ 0.05, **≤ 0.01, ***≤ 0.001. Ordinal and interval variables coded to run from 
low to high. See online supplement for full details of scaling.   
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i In this article, ‘political’ elites refer to politicians and political parties. ‘Traditional security 
actors’ refer to these political elites and security professionals. Other societal actors that are 
outside of this, namely religious elites, are referred to as non-traditional security actors based on 
the above reference point. 
ii Yin (2014: 51) defines a critical case as ‘critical to your theory or theoretical propositions’: 
where the theory has ‘specified a clear set of circumstances within which its propositions are 
believed to be true…the single case then can be used to determine whether the propositions are 
correct…’. This article is specifically testing the theoretical assumptions of securitisation theory 
in terms of the de/construction of security being a top-down, elite driven process. In a state (the 
UK) where religion is in retreat to increasing secularisation, the dominant faith (Anglicanism) is 
viewed as a weak political force in comparison to titular faiths in states where religion is more 
prominent, and the CoE’s central (desecuritising) migration messages are in a minority, the 
assumption that elites can convince their audience to view an issue as security or otherwise is 
tested in challenging circumstances.  
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iii In the 2011 Census, 59% of UK residents identified as Christian, the largest constituency 
being Anglicans (Office for National Statistics, 2012). However, in figures from The British 
Social Attitudes Survey (NatCen Social Research, 2011) only 20% identify as Anglican 
(approximately 12.66 million; Roman Catholicism 9%, Non-Christian 6%). A report from the 
National Secular Society (2012, 25 January. Available at: 
http://www.secularism.org.uk/news/2012/01/census-question-questioned) argues that the 
disparity is rooted in the religious affiliation question in the 2011 Census being leading. Even 
taking those of the British Social Attitudes Survey the number of affiliates are substantive.  
The 820,000 figure is acquired from Church attendance in Britain, 2005-2015 (British 
Religion in Numbers, 2017). The data is clustered at five year intervals. The averages are 
calculated by dividing by three the sum of the figures provided for 2005, 2010 and 2015 for the 
Anglican Church in England and Wales. Due to scale, for the discourse analysis of the Anglican 
faith, attention has been restricted to elite actors and Church publications from the Church of 
England (CoE). This has been deemed prudent as the CoE is the ‘mother church’ of the global 
Anglican Communion and therefore also carries jurisdiction over those who identify as 
Anglican in other parts of the UK. 
 
iv Whether a successful securitisation requires emergency measures to be implemented or 
merely that they are ‘possible to legitimize’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 25) (the CS at times state both 
positions) forms a key debate in securitisation research (Balzacq et al., 2016; Floyd, 2016). 
Whilst this article does not engage directly with this debate, using public opinion data to 
determine the impact of elite discourse may offer one way of conceptualising ‘success’ (see, for 
example, Salter, 2008, 2011; Vuori, 2008).  
v It may be argued that the case of Greece is not a useful comparison case for CoE influence in 
the UK as the Greek Orthodox faith is far more hierarchical than the CoE and religiosity in 
Greece is generally far higher. To clarify, this article is not arguing that CoE elites will have as 
wide-reaching an influence as those heading the Orthodox Church in Greece. The main point is 
that committed Anglicans who attend frequently are assumed to be exposed to elite messaging 
on migration. It is this committed group of followers that religious elites in the UK may be able 
to influence. A brief analysis regarding the appetite for religious involvement in politics appears 
to support this view. The European Values Survey (2008) asks: ‘How much do you agree with 
the following: Religious leaders should not influence government decisions’ (Strongly Agree, 
Agree, Neither Agree Nor Disagree, Disagree, Disagree Strongly). Although unfortunately not 
an ideal question as it does not unpack whether the devout support religious involvement 
specifically in the political affairs of those who are religious, the question does tap into a more 
general sense of religious influence in politics. Interestingly, 22% of Anglicans disagreed 
(spanning both ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’). A similar figure was found for UK Catholics 
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(27%) but there was a large distinction between CoE Protestants and Protestants affiliated to the 
Church of Scotland (13%) and the Non-Religious (15%) (and surprisingly the figure stood at 
just 13% for those identifying as Greek Orthodox in Greece). Breaking the data down further, 
when looking at UK Anglicans who attend once a week, the figure rises to 40%, whereas for 
Anglicans who never/practically never attend the figure is just 15%. Overall these data 
demonstrate that more committed Anglicans are more supportive of religious elite involvement 
in politics, helping to bolster the argument that those who attend more frequently are more 
predisposed to digesting the messages of ‘their’ elites.  
vi Whether securitisation is a purely rhetorical phenomenon (the so-called ‘internalist’ or 
philosophical stance) or also relies on non-discursive practices (the so-called ‘externalist’ or 
sociological position) has sparked intense debate (see Balzacq, 2011; Case Collective, 2006; 
Stritzel, 2007, 2012). Hansen (2011) argues that the philosophical view does not exclude non-
discursive, contextual factors – an assumption, it is posited, based upon a misunderstanding of 
the poststructuralist view of discourse. It appears that both ‘camps’ are in agreement: a pure 
focus on rhetoric, devoid of any contextual understanding, is insufficient. Hence this study 
accounts for ‘external’ factors, namely the cultural capital religious actors possess and the 
subsequent greater likelihood of fellow Anglicans internalising frames from ideologically 
aligned sources.   
 
vii The CS are not arguing that society has an objective, singular character. Rather it is posited 
that notions of existential threat founded upon Schmittian friend/enemy logic (Williams, 2003), 
that are integral to a securitisation, are simply conveyed by securitising actors who desire to 
unify a society/relevant audience (see McSweeney, 1996, 1999 for a critique; see Williams, 
1998, 2003 for a riposte).  
 
viii A potential objection to the binary securitising/desecuritising approach to ‘coding’ is rooted 
in the concept of ‘asecurity’: the absence of security where messages appear to neither reinforce 
nor challenge an object of security (Wæver, 1998). However, asecurity is not deemed relative to 
this article. All sources selected for analysis are those which engage with the issue of migration 
directly – as such, drawing on a social constructionist view of discourse, discourses cannot be 
neutral. They must, however marginally, either support or challenge the securitisation of 
migration. 
 
ix In addition to 2005 being a pivotal moment in UK migration politics with the Conservative 
party’s explicit politicisation of immigration and New Labour’s move toward a more 
restrictionist immigration discourse (Schain, 2008), the ESS unfortunately does not distinguish 
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between Christian denominations prior to Round 4 (2008) making it unfeasible to link discourse 
to audience attitudes before this date. 
 
x Five are specifically Church documents, including: the Church’s open letter for the 2015 
General Election (GE); a 2009 ‘guidance note’ on ‘Countering far right political parties, 
extremist groups and racist politics’; the Church’s 2014 ‘Position Statement’ on refugees; the 
Church’s 2015 theology-centred report, Mission, Migrants and Refugees; and the 2009 General 
Synod (carried) motion on asylum seekers. The remaining three documents are also open letters 
providing guidance for the 2005 GE, the 2009 European Elections, and the 2010 GE but were 
penned by the Archbishop on behalf of the Church. However, the similarities between the two 
(pre-election advice) makes it logical to group them together. 
 
xi All questions from the multivariate analysis are available in the online supplement. 
 
xii The coding has been reversed from the original format such that higher values represent 
greater religiosity. 
 
xiii Round 3, 2006, is not included in the multivariate analyses as the ESS does not distinguish 
between religious denominations in the UK. 
 
xiv The relevant data to test intergroup contact was only available in Round 7. Yet, as contact has 
strong theoretical and empirical support as a powerful predictor of immigration attitudes 
(Hewstone and Swart, 2011; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006), it was deemed prudent to test its 
effects. As such, a separate round-by-round regression was carried out, where Round 7 included 
and excluded contact. The results of the key independent variables, the religiosity measures, 
were not affected; therefore this additional analysis has been excluded from this paper. 
 
xv The size of the effect was calculated using the standard deviations (SD) of Attendance 
(SD=1.44) and the Immigration Attitudes Index (SD=2.28) and multiplying the latter by the 
standardised coefficient (Beta) for Attendance in Model 3 (0.226***). The sum is as follows: 
0.226x2.28=0.52. Thus, holding everything else constant, and once all controls have been 
entered, for every 1.44 increase in Attendance, immigration attitudes increase by 0.52. 
 
xvi The regression was also split by ESS round and there is almost no variation in which 
variables are statistically significant. Attendance is statistically significant in all 3 Models in 3/4 
rounds (2008, 2012, 2014). There are no effects found for Prayer and just two effects for 
Religious Feeling (Model 2 of Round 4 and 7).  
